

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 281736Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3597

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 25541

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: FURTHER ON PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S VISIT TO CHINA

1. SUMMARY. SECRETARY OF STATE DE LIPKOWSKI DESCRIBED CHINESE FEARS OF SOVIET UNION AS AT LEAST PARTLY GENUINE. HE CONFIRMED THAT CHINESE HAD PRESSED FRENCH TO RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK REGIME. HE URGED THAT IN ITS DEALINGS WITH CHINA US SHOULD, ABOVE ALL, AVOID GIVING CHINESE IMPRESSION THEY HAD BEEN USED IN ORDER OBTAIN US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

2. DCM CALLED ON DE LIPKOWSKI, SECRETARY OF STATE, MINISTRY FONAFF, SEPTEMBER 27, TO ENQUIRE ABOUT PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA. DE LIPKOWSKI IS FORMER CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER WHO SERVED IN CHINA IN 1940'S AND SPENT TEN YEARS STUDYING CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. HE WAS ONLY OTHER FRENCHMAN PRESENT DURING MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT POMPIDOU AND MAO TSE-TUNG. MAO HAD WITH HIM ON THAT OCCASION CHOU EN-LAI AND WANG-HUNG-WEN.

3. AFTER ALLUDING TO REPORTS THAT FRENCH NEWSMEN HAD BEEN TAKEN TO UNDERGROUND AIR RAID SHELTERS ON FIRST DAY OF POMPIDOU VISIT. DCM ASKED FOR DE LIPKOWSKI'S ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE VIEW OF USSR AND WHETHER REPORTED CHINESE FEARS APPEARED GENUINE.

4. DE LIPKOWSKI, AFTER REFERRING AT LENGTH TO HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA, SAID THAT
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THE CHINESE WERE OBSESSED BY FEAR OF FOREIGN ENCIRCLEMENT, WHICH WAS EVIDENCED IN THEIR EYES BY SOVIET EFFORTS LINE UP NATIONS ON THEIR PERIPHERY IN SOVIET SPONSORED ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSAL. CHINESE HAD TALKED ABOUT TWO HEGEMONIES IN

THE WORLD, BUT DE KIPKOWSKI ADDED IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY WERE ONLY REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT ONE OF THESE. THEY VIEWED THE US AS WITHDRAWING FROM ASIA AND ALSO EUROPE AND BEING ESSENTIALLY NON-AGGRESSIVE. THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS VIEWED AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND TO CHINESE SECURITY AND WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING BOTH EXPANSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE. THUS, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, DE LIPKOWSKI FELT CHINESE FEARS OF SOVIET UNION WERE AT LEAST PARTLY GENUINE.

5. DE LIPKOWSKI SAID MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO LARGELY DEVOTED TO MAO'S PRESENTATION OF PAST EVENTS AND HOW HE HAD FOUGHT FOR 30 YEARS TO ACHIEVE CHINESE INDEPENDENCE. MAO FELT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS OWED NOTHING TO THE SOVIETS IN GAINING POWER. PRESENCE OF WANG HUNG-WEN AT MEETING WITH MAO, HE THOUGHT, HAD BEEN OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT CHINESE LEADERSHIP NOT SOLELY CONFINED TO OLD MEN. WHILE CHOU WAS COMPLETELY SILENT, MAO PRAISED WANG AS UNUSUALLY CLEVER AND ABLE COLLEAGUE WHO HAD FOUGHT IN MOREA. SUBSEQUENTLY, DE LIPKOWSKI SAT NEXT TO WANG AT LUNCHEON AND FOUND HIM PASSIVE CONVERSATIONIST UNTIL HE MENTIONED SOVIETS, AT WHICH POINT WANG IMMEDIATELY BRIGHTENED UP AND CASTIGATED SOVIETS SHARPLY. HE THOROUGHLY AGREED WITH DE LIPKOWSKI'S ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIETS HAD HISTORY OF MISTAKES IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH CHINA STEMMING FROM DAYS OF BORODIN VISIT.

6. AS REGARDS EUROPE, CHINESE EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT US FORCES REMAIN IN EUROPE. THEY CONTRASTED SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR SATELLITES WITH CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA, CLAIMING THAT SOVIETS WANTED TOADIES WHO WOULD SLAVISHLY FOLLOW THEIR LINES AND OVER WHOM THEY HAD DEFINITE CONTROL, WHEREAS CHINESE ALLEGEDLY WERE FULLY PREPARED FOR NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA TO FOLLOW COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT POLICY. THUS, CHINESE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT EXERT ANY PRESSURE ON EITHER NORTH KOREA OR NORTH VIETNAM TO DISSUADE THEM FROM HAVING DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS. CHINESE HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT WAY EVENTS WERE MOVING IN SECRET

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EUROPE, (I.E., MBFR--ON WHICH DE LIPKOWSKI NOTED FRENCH SAW EYE-TO-EYE WITH CHINESE), THERE WAS PROSPECT OF EUROPE BECOMING "FINLANDIZED".

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
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EXDIS

7. IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION, DE LIPKOWSKI CONFIRMED THAT CHINESE HAD STRONGLY URGED FRENCH TO RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT FOR CAMBODIA. FRENCH HAD BEEN STRUCK BY HEAVY CHINESE EMPHASIS ON SITUATION IN CAMBODIA TO ALMOST COMPLETE EXCLUSION OF NY REFERENCE TO EITHER VIETNAM AND LAOS. (SEE ALSO PARIS 25540.)

8. DE LIPKOWSKI SAID HE HAD JUST HAD LUNCH THAT DAY WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR CHERVONENKO, WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS AMBASSADOR TO CHINA. DE LIPKOWSKI HAD BEGUN CONVERSATION BY OBSERVING THAT HE DID NOT REALIZE HOW MUCH OF A PROBLEM SOVIETS HAD WITH CHINA UNTIL HIS RECENT TRIP. AT THIS POINT, DCM EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT CREDIBILITY OF CHINESE FEARS OF MASSIVE SOVIET ATTACK ACROSS THEIR FRONTIERS AND ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY INDICATION THAT CHINESE FEARS DIRECTED MORE AGAINST POSSIBLE SOVIET SPONSORED PLOT TO REPLACE CURRENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP. DE LIPKOWSKI PROMPTLY REJOINED THAT IN HIS LUNCH WITH CHERVONENKO, LATTER HAD ALLEGED THAT THERE WERE STRONG ELEMENTS WITHIN CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHICH FAVORED IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION. DE LIPKOWSKI HAD CONCLUDED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT INDEED BE THINKING ALONG SUCH LINES. HE SAID HE TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO WARN CHERVONENKO THAT IT WOULD BE HEIGHT OF FOLLY FOR SOVIETS TO PURSUE IDEA OF INTERVENTION IN CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

9. DE LIPKOWSKI OBSERVED THAT ONE NEVER KNOWS WHAT CHINESE ARE THINKING, AND HE COULD SAY THAT AS MAN WHO HAD SPENT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF HIS LIFE IN STUDY OF CHINESE. AFTER PRO-
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FESSING THAT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IN NO POSITION TO TELL THE US HOW IT SHOULD HANDLE ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, ON TWO OCCASIONS DURING CONVERSATION HE STATED THAT HE THOUGHT GREATEST MISTAKE US COULD MAKE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE TO GIVE CHINESE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAD SOMEHOW BEEN USED IN ORDER TO US TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM VIETNAM. A SENSITIVE, XENOPHOBIC AND SUSPICIOUS PEOPLE, HE BELIEVED IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT CHINESE BE TREATED AS EQUALS AND EQUALS WORTHY OF RESPECT.

10. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
IRWIN

SECRET

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